University of Pennsylvania

Law Review
And American Law Register
FOUNDED 1852
Published Monthly. November to June. by the University of Pennsylvania Law School,
at 34th and Chestnut Streeth, Philadelphia, Pa.
VOL. 72.

NOVEMBER, 1923.

No. I.

THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE.
The Law: "A few strong instincts and a few plain
rules."-WVordsworth.

The formation, under the laws of the United States applicable to the-District of Columbia, oii February 23, 1923, of a
corporation under the name of
TiE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,

for cducational purposes and specifically
"to promote the clarification and simplification of the law
and its better adaptation to social needs, to secure the better administration of justice, and to encourage and carry on
scholarly and scientific legal work,"
marks a definite and important step in a movement which has
been under discussion and in progress in England and America
for a number of years past. The significance of this particular
incorporation is indicated by the fact that it was authorized and
directed at a meeting attended by the Chief Justice of the United
States and two of the Associate Justices of the United States
Supreme Court, by five Judg.s of United States Circuit Courts
of Appeals, by Judges of twenty-seven of the highest courts of.
States of the American Union, besides the President and mene-

2

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW.

bers of the Council of the American Bar Association, and representatives of seventeen State Bar Associations, of thirty-three
law schools, of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws from
twenty-two States, as well as by two hundred other lawyers
from various parts of the Union. The Chief Justice of the
United States, the Secretary of State, the Chief Justices of the
Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals of the District of
Columbia, the United States Attorney for the District, and the
acknowledged leader of the American bar-the Honorable Elihu
Root-were incorporators, and, immediately upon compliance
with the requirements of corporate existence, all of the persons
assembled in the meeting above referred to became members of
the corporation.
Throughout its history, the bar constantly has busied itself
with various methods for improving the administration of justice. Institutions for the encouragement and pursuit of scholarly
and scientific legal work never have been lacking, from the early
days of the Inns of Court, so picturesquely described by Fortescue,' until the present time. The especial need of the work undertaken by the American Law Institute and the particular direction in which it intends to pursue that work, require some detailed consideration, in order to mark out the boundaries within
which it proposes to operate, as well as to indicate the fields
into which it does not intend to enter.
The initial purpose of the organization, as set forth in the
charter, is -to promote the clarification and simplification of the
law.
"The law," wrote Dr. Samuel Johnson, "is the last result
of human wisdom acting upon human experience for the benefit
of the public." Sir John Salmond, in language of professional
precision, defines law as "the body of principles recognized and
applied by the state in the administration of justice, or, more
shortly: the law consists of the rules recognized and acted upon
by. courts of justice." 2
The Laws of England. Trans. by A. Amos, Cambridge, pp. 178-9 (z825).
'Salmond. The Science of Jurisprudence.
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These rules, in America, are to be ascertained, first, from
the Constitution of the United States and those of the several
States; second, from statutes enacted by the Federal Congress
and by the legislatures of the several States; and, third, from
decisions of courts. The second and third sources of law mentioned, Mr. Justice Holnes says, consist of: 'a body of reports,
of treatises and of statutes, in this country and in England, extending back for six hundred years and now increasing annually
by hundreds. In these sibylline leaves are gathered the scattered
prophecies of the past upon the cases in which the axe will fall.
These are what properly have been called the oracles of the law.
Far the most important and pretty nearly the whole meaning of
every new effort of legal thought is to make these prophecies
more precise, and to generalize them into a thoroughly connected system." "1 Hence, Judge Holmes says, the object of the
study of the law is prediction-"The prediction of the incidence
of the public force through the instrumentality of courts."
Judge Cardozo, in the introduction to his lectures on "The
Nature of the Judicial Process," describes the field which a judge
must explore in deciding a given case which is not specifically
covered by a written constitution or a statute, as "the land of
mystery," in which "the judge must look to the common law for
the rule that fits the case." The common law "which consists
of customs and principles handed down from remote times and
accepted from age to age as furnishing rules of legal right,"
has been embodied in and to a great extent created by judicial
decisions and dicta. "These, indeed, so far as they have relation
to the common law and statute law, are not so much a source of
law as authoritative expositions of it; .... . 4 Nevertheless,
they are for all practical purposes "the law," which all citizens
are presumed to know and which every lawyer and every judge
seeks to ascertain, with the aid of countless digests, myr;ads of
reports and many textbooks.
The civil codes of North and South Dakota, respectively,
define law as "a rule of property and of conduct prescribed by
'The Path of the Law. in "Collected Legal Papers," p. 167.
'Report of Digest of Law Commission, 1867.
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the sovereign power."

The rule of the sovereign power, they

declare, is expressed:
"(i ) By the constitution of the State;
(2) By the statutes of the State:
(3) By the ordinances of other and subordinate legislative bodies;
(4) By the decisions of the tribunals enforcing those
rules which, though not connected, form what is
known as customary or common law."
The evidence of the common law, they further declare, is to be
found in the decisions of the tribunals.
The courts of forty-eight American States, besides those of
the Federal jurisdiction, are-daily adding to this volume of the
*'evidence of the common law." Naturally, the more complex
and varied the sources of authority from which the rules of law
are derived, -the greater the uncertainty and the more difficult
the effort to predict what rule will be applied in any given case.
How the common law is found by a judge in actual praLtice, is described by Judge Cardozo as follows:
"Tile first thing he does is to compare the case before
him with the precedents, whether stored in his mind or hidden in the books. . . . Back of precedents are the
basic juridical eonceptions which are the postulates of judicial reasoning, and farther back are the habits of life, the
institutions of society. in which those conceptions had their
origin, and which, by a process of interaction, they have
modified in turn. None the less, in a system so highly developed as our own, precedents have so covered the ground
that they fix the point of departure from which the labor
of the judge begins. Almost invariably, his first step is to
examine and compare them. If they are plain and to the
point, there may be need of nothing more. Stare decisis is
at least the everyday working rule of our law." 6
The volume of decisions by judges, declaring the common
law, a century ago had begun to accumulate with sufficient rapid"Civil Code N. D., Sects. 43-26-4328, 4330; Civil Code S. D., Title, Substantive Law, Sees. I, 3.
' Nature of the Judicial Prcess,'pp. i9-2o.
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ity to cause apprehension and alarm in the minds of floughtful
lawyers and judges. In an address to the bar of Suffolk County,

.Massachusetts, delivered by Jusice Story in 1821 (referred to
by Charles \Varren in his "'listorv of the American Bar"), he
said:
"The mass of the law is. to be sure, acmcmulating with
It is impossible to
,tn almost incredible rapidity. . .
look without some discouragement pupon the ponderous volumes which the next half century will add to the groaning
shelves of our jurists."
And thirty years ago Judge Dillon, legtmring before tle law
school of Yale University, said:
"There inevitably comes a stage in the legal history of
every people when its laws become 'so voluminous and vast'
that an authoritative and systematic recompilation and restatement of them is necessary, to the end th at they m111y
be accessible and of (to use in default of a better, Bentham's uncouth but expressive word) cognoscible -bulk, if
not to those who are governed by them, at least to those
whose business it is to advise concerning them and to those
Whose duty it is to administer and apply then-i."

This condition had become so alarming in "England that
in the year 866 a Royal Commission was appointed, -kanown as
-the "Digest of Law Commission," composed of -the most eminent lawyers and judges of -that day, including, among others,
Lord "Cranworth, Lord Westbury, Lord -Cairns, Lord Hatherway and'Lord Selbourne,
"to inquire into the expediency of a digest oaf law, :and the
best means of accomplishing that object, and of -otherwise
exhibiting in a compendious and accessible -form the law as
.embodied in judicial decisions."
The word "digest" was here used in the sense of what we
term "restatement"-a methodical compendium of what the-law
is, not merely a collection of abstracts of decisions arranged
'The Law and Jurisprudence of England and "America. John F. Dillon,

(1894) p. 269.
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under various topics' and indexed for reference. In the first report of the Commission, made May 13, 1867, reference was
made to the vast number of judicial decisions dispersed through
upward of thirteen hundred volumes of reports of the English
courts, comprising upwards of ioo,ooo cases, exclusive of 15o
volumes of Irish Reports, besides yearly*accessions; all of which
the Commissioners characterized as "a great chaos of judicial
legislation." This mass of decision has been increased enormously since 867-not so much in England, as in this country,
where the courts of forty-nine separate sovereignties are daily
adding to the mass.
In the year 1921 alone, 143 volumes of decisions of the
courts of the States of the Union were published, and i55 in
the year 1922. The American Digest of decisions of American
courts (Century Edition), issued by the West Publishing Company, covering the period from 1658 to 1896, consists of fifty
portly volumes, each of which contains from 2900 to 3450 page

columns, aside from the index. Sixty-three bulky supplemental
volumes bring the series down to *the close of 1922, each volume containing about 2377 pages. These are merely digests, or
brief summaries of decisions, indexed to particular topics. The
National Reporter System for the year 1922 reports decisions
rendered by courts in a total of 23,468 cases.8
A little encouragement in the gloom of this increasing cloud
of witnesses may be derived from the fact that,. while 1523
volumes of State and Federal reports were published in ;9oo
and 166 in 19O1, there were only 148 in 1921 and 156 in 1922.
'Atlantic

Vols. 114-118,

Reporter

Northeastern Reporter,
Northwestern Reporter,
Pacific Reporter,
Southeastern Reporter.
Southern Reporter,
Southwestern Reporter,
Federal Reporter,
N. Y. Supp. Reporter,
Supreme Court Reporter,

x,7oo cases;

133-1.36, 1,6o9
" 185-19o, 2,394
202-210, 4,133
' xx14, 2,565
90- 93, 2,301
235-z44, 4,432
276-284, 2,164
"
xgi-96, 1,387
42-43,

703

Grand total; ............ 23,468

"
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The reason for this improvement is not apparent on the surface.
Despite the use of thinner paper. there is no marked increase in
the number of pages in each of the official volumes of reports
printed in recent years. But in the State of New York, particularly in the Appellate Divisions of the Supreme Court, there
has been a large increase in the number of cases in which only
"memorandum opinions" are written. The number of reported
opinions of these Appellate Divisions increased from .3255 in
19o, to 5042 in 1922. but the number of memorandum opinions included in these figures increased in the same period from
1915 in the year 19o to 4279 in 1922. This increase in the
use of memoranda also resulted in decreasing the average length
of opinions from 2.7 pages in I9OI to .62 page in 1922, and
this fact largely explains the reason for the slightly diminished
number of volumes of reported decisions above mentioned. An
examination of the reports of the forty-eight States which I have
had made, shows that in twenty-one States the number of volumes of reported decisions issued annually has increased, in
fourteen it has remained stationary, and in thirteen there has
been a diminution. Outside the State of New York, the gain
and loss in the number of volumes almost balance each other.
Still, even with the reduction above referred to in New York,
the State courts alone are adding to the literature of the lawthe authoritative literature of the law-at the rate of upwards
of i5o volumes a year.
A needless complexity in the law, is one of the defects especially commented upon by Sir John Salmond in his work on
"Jurisprudence":
"It is not possible, indeed," the learned Judge admits,
"for any fully developed body of law to be such that he
who runs may read it. Being, as it is, the reflection within
courts of justice of the complex facts of civilized existence, a very considerable degree of elaboration is inevitable.
Nevertheless. the gigantic bulk and bewildering difficulties
of our own labyrinthine system are far beyond anything
that is called for bv the necessities of the case. Partly
through the methods of its historical development, and
partly through the influence of that love of subtlety which
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has always been the besetting sin of the legal mind, our law
is filled with needless distinctions which add enormously to
its bulk and nothing to its value, while they render a great
part of it unintelligible to any but the expert." U
The Committee organized in May, 1922, at the instance
of the Association of American Law Schools, to consider the
possibility of a permanent organization for the improvement of
the law, in its report to the meeting held in Washington on February 23, 1923, enumerated as among the particular causes of
uncertainty and complexity in the law the following:
Lack of agreement on fundamental principles of the common law;
Lack of precision in the use of legal terms;
Conflicting and badly drawn statutory provisions;
Great volume of recorded decisions;
Ignorance of judges and lawyers;
Number and variety of novel legal questions;
Complexity of the conditions of life;
Lack of systematic development of the law;
Unnecessary development of administrative provisions;
Varyinig law in different jurisdictions.'0
The first report of the British "Digest of Law Comnission," made May 13, 1867, contained the following recommendation:
"A digest correctly framed and revised from time to
time would go far to remedy the evils we have pointed out.
It would bring the mass of the law within a moderate compass and it would give order and method to the constituent
parts. For a digest (in the sense in which we understand
the term to be used in Your Majesty's Commission and
in which we use it in this report) would be a condensed
summary of the law as it exists, arranged in systematic
order, under appropriate titles and subdivisions and divided
into-distinct articles or propositions which would be supported by references to the sources of law whence they
were severally derived, and might be illustrated by cita'Jurisprudence, Sec. to,. p.

25.

Report, Part II, pp. 66-84.
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tions of the principal instances in which the rules stated
had been discussed or applied. Such a digest would in our
opinion be highly beneficial .
"Moreover, such a digest would be the best preparation for a code, if at any future time codification of the
law should be resolved on."
The term "digest- in this report, as already has been noted,
is used in the same sense as the term "restatement" is employed
in the proceedings leading up to the organization of the American Law Institute, and in its proceedings. The Royal Conimission pointed out that such a work could only be performed by a
commission and would involve considerable expenditure, and it
recommended that a portion of a digest sufficient in extent to
be a fair specimen of the whole, should be prepared il the first
instance.
The second report of the Digest of Law Commission, submitted May I I, 187o; set forth that the Commission had, putrsuant to the authority granted to it to carry out the reconimendations in its first report, selected the three subjects of Bills of Exchange, Aortgages and Easements, and had secured the services
of three members of the bar, each of whom was directed to
frame a. digest of the law on one of those subjects; that these
gentlemen had submitted
" 'Materials of considerable value,' but the Commission
thinks it inadvisable to continue this mode of proceeding.
"We have found," runs the report, "that the examination and revision of these materials with that rigorous care
and accuracy which would be requisite before we could lay
them before Your Majesty as specimens of a digest of law
would involve considerable further delay and expense,
while on the other hand we have . satisfied ourselves that
these specimens would have again to le revised, aid perhaps recast, when the time arrived for -inserting them as
portions of a complete and systematic work."
They say that experiment had served to bring out the inherent difficulties in the undertaking.
"A complete digest cannot be executed without the
assistance of the most highly skilled persons whose services
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can he procured. The success of the work will depend on
their efficiency. They must give to the undertaking the
whole of their time and energy. And it is obvious that the
services of such persons cannot he obtained without the
offer of permanent employment and high remuneration."
The Commission therefore recommended the appointment
of a body of three such persons, charged. with the duty of executing a digest as a whole, provided with every assistance and
acting under the control of a committee of the Privy Council or
otherwise. Sir James S. Willes, who upon the death of Lord
Cranford had been substituted as a member of the Commission,
dissented from the report, because, while he thought a first-rate
modern digest of the English law desirable as a whole for professional use, he considered that, after all, it would be only a
makeshift for a code or series of codes, which he thought preferable to a digest.
One of the remedies for the complexity and uncertainty of
the common law, which has been recommended by members of
a school whose principal exponent in England was Jeremy Benthani, and in the United States, David Dudley Field, is the codification of the common law. Four of the States of the American
Union, Georgia, California, North and South Dakota, have followed this course by enacting codes of substantive law. But in
none of these States has the legislature attempted to abolish all
law but the statute law. How far the law has been clarified by
reducing it to these statutory forms is a matter of controversy.
After the failure of the "Digest of Law Commission" to
accomplish any practical result, professional efforts in England
were directed, first, to improving the system of law reporting,
and second, to a careful systematic revision of statutes on different subjects, which has gone far in the direction of completely
codifying the common law of England. But the inability of
this Commission to accomplish the purposes of its original appointment, inspired Lord Halsbury to the preparation and publication of his series of twenty-nine volumes of "The Laws of
England." In the introduction to this work, Lord Halsbury
says:
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"The alteration of existing law and the process of
merely stating what the law is, are two very different functions, and the confusion between the two has marred many
an effort to get a clear and intelligible code. Mr. Gladstone
once said in the House of Commons that you should first
get a comprehensive account of what the law is before you
commence amending it; and a great many law reformers
have failed because they have not observed the necessity of
this preliminary inquiry."
Referring to the failure of the work of the Digest of Law
Commission, he says:
"It has occurred to some minds that an attempt might
be made by private enterprise to carry out in its main outlines the scheme which was recommended in the report of
the Commission appointed in 1866, and such an attempt
has been made in this work. Different treatises upon various divisions of the law, and by different authors, have been
brought together, so that a selected body of writers may
expound their several topics, and at the same time refer
to such authoritative decisions and enactments as- support
the propositions which they lay down."
The result, as Lord Halsbury pointed out, was not a mere
encyclopedia, not a mere collection of cases, but a number of
treatises composed by learned lawyers, supported by the decisions
of great judges.
Following this work, there also has been published in England, under the editorship of Air. Edward Jenks, "A Digest of
the English Civil Law," divided into five volumes, of which
Volumes i and 2 were published in i9o 5 , Volume 3 in 1911, and
Volumes 4 and 5 in x916.

But in general, the tendency in England has been mainly in
the direction of reducing the law to statutory form. This is
said by Sir John Salmond to be the tendency of modern times
and one which he believes ultimately will prevail; yet he points
out:
"The process is one of exceeding difficulty owing to
the complexity and elaboration of English legal doctrine.
Many portions of the law are not yet ripe for it and pre-
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mature codification is worse than none at all. . ..
Unenacted law is the principal and enacted law is merely accessorv. The activity of the legislature is called for only on
special occasions to do that which lies beyond the constructive or remedial efficacy of -the common law." 11
Judge Dillon, lecturing before the Law School of Yale University in 1892, said:
"One related question of great practical interest and
moment still remains to a large extent undecided, and that
is as to the wisdom of undertaking a systematic restatement of the body of our statutory and case law. This subject is actively engaging the best "minds of the profession in
both countries." ,
And speak'ng of this work of restatement, lie said:
"It is not possible to doubt that the bulk of the existing
law can be greatly, and, if the work be properly done, advantageously reduced. This is in fact demonstrable both
by reason and examples. Cases do not constitute the law,
but are illustrations and practical applications of its general
principles. These principles are comparatively few. Lord
Mansfield went to the pith and marrow of the business when
he said: 'The law does not consist of particular
cases, but of general principles which are illustrated and explained by these cases.* Re.r. v. Bembridge, 3 Doug. 332. It
is therefore practicable to extract these principles and state
them in authoritative form. This is undoubtedly, as Lord
Hale says. 'a very choice and tender business' and must be
performed deliberately and by the most competent 'hands.
Mr. Justice Stephen's digest of the law of evidence is an
example, among others, of what may be done in this direction. M\r. Taylor's treatise on evidence contains, says Mr.
Justice Stephen, 1797 pages, refers to 90o judicial. decisions and cites nearly 750 Acts of Parliament. Greenleaf's work is quite as extensive. Now 'Mr. Justice Stephen
extracts the essential principles of the law of evidence,
states these with precision, illustrates them by example, ar" Jurisprudence.. Sec. 53.

"Law and jurisprudence of England and America, Lecture XIII.
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ranges them in a systematic form in 143 articles, all of
which, with annotations and references to the American
cases by Professor Chase, is brought wit'hin the moderate
compass of 245 pages."
The report ,of -tile Committee on -the Establishment .of a
Permanent Organization 'for the Improvement of the Law, enumerated certain factors promoting greater certainty and. simplicity in the law, among which were:
(i) The influence of the decisions of one State on the
common law of other States;
(2)
The enactment of uniform State lavs;
(3) The increasing exercise of legislative power .by the
Federal Government;
(4) "1"i. application of uniform laws by the Federal Government;
(5) The national .law schools.

The Comnfittee reached the conclusion that one of the most
potent factors in the removal of the uncertainty of the law,
would be the formulation of clear and accurate statements, in
simplified form, of the common law -on various -topics, prepared
by trained students of the law, submitted to the criticism -of the
bar, and published with the authority of the Institute and the
prestige of the great body of lawyers and judges of tbe country.
Specifically, they pointed out tlat the-wok. thus performed was
not intended to be submitted to the legislature for enactment into
law. It is designed to appeal to the intelligence of bench and
bar. The Committee expressed the belief that, if the -work be
-done as designed, the .restatement would be accepted by the profession as evidence of what the law is at the date of its publication, without the necessity of ransacking the thousands of.precedents which will have been examined, analyzed and weighed by
the authors of the respective treatises.
Examples are not lacking as. to the influence upon the law
of the writings of eminent students and text-writers. In England, Coke and Blackstone stand out as more essential lawgivers than many Parliaments whose statutes have attempted to
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end legal debate. Professor Pound has very clearly described
the great services of Kent and Story in restating and simplifying
the common law in America. Referring to Story, whose contribution he considers the greater, he says:
"What Story, the judge, failed in, Story, the textwriter, accomplished triumphantly. For more than anything
else the books of our great 19th Century text-writers saved
the common law. Here were guides for judge and practitioner, well written, learned, well ordered, and, as things
went then, well reasoned."
And after enumerating Judge Story's works, lie says:

"In quantity, in timeliness, and in its relation to the
law that went before, and came after, this body of legal
writing is in many ways comparable to that of Coke. In
each case the judge-made law of the past was restated and
was made conveniently and, as it were, authoritatively available for the future."
This work, he adds, must be counted as one of the controlling factors in the shaping of American law.!3
Aside from the writings of James Kent and Joseph Story,
in more modern times, we have had the "Treatise on the Law
of Private Corporations,' by Victor Morawetz, which almost
immediately upon its publication was accepted as authoritative
by the highest courts in the land. Still more recently, such books
as "A Digest of the Laws of England with Reference to the
Conflict of Laws," by A. V. Dicey; "The Principles of the Law
of Contracts," by Sir Frederick Pollock, and in America, Williston's "Law of Contracts," have been published, which, in effect are restatements of the common law of those subjects
respectively.
Senator Root in presenting the report of the Committee to
the Vashington meeting on February 23d last, described the
proposed undertaking of the American Law Institute in the following language:
1

"Judge Story in the Making of American Law.
AMERICAS LAW

Riv. 676.

By Roscoe Pound, 48
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"Now, if you can have the law systematically, scientifically stated. the principles stated by competent men, giving their discussions of the theories upon which their statements are based, giving a presentation and discussion of
all the judicial decisions upon which their statements are
based, and if such a statement can be revised and criticised
and tested by a competent group of lawyers of eminence,
and when their work is done, if their conclusidns can be
. if that can be done when
submitted to the bar
the work is completed, we -wvill have a statement of the
common law of America which will be a prima facie basis
n which judicial action will rest: and any lawyer, whose
interest in litigation requires him to say that a different
view of the law shall be taken, will have upon his shoulders
the burden to overturn the statement. Instead of going
back through ten thousand cases it will have been done for
him: there will be not a conclusive presumption but a practical prima facie statement upon which, unless it-is overturned, judgment may rest." 14
The report of the Committee on the proposed organization
of the Institute had pointed out, as did the British Digest of
Law Commission. that the work involved in the preparation of
a restatement of the law which should command the respect and
secure the support of bench and bar, would require the employiment of the most competent members of the profession and the
expenditure of a considerable sum of money., With that practical common sense which is characteristic of American lawyers,
the framers of the report submitted with it an estimate of the
probable cost of carrying on the work in all of its details, and
presented a budget showing estimates of annual expenditures
amounting to about $iooooo.
The Carnegie Corporation had contributed $25,000 to cover
the expenses of conducting the preliminary inquiry and securing
the services of those who united in the report on the establishment of a permanent organization, including the expenses of
the Washington meeting. Shortly after the corporate organization of the Institute, the Carnegie Corporation evidenced its conAmerican Law Institute, Account of Proceedings at Organization, p. 5z.
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tinued interest in the work by appropriating to the use of the
Americaii Law Institute for its general purposes the sum of
$1,075,000 to be paid at substantially the rate of $Ioo,ooo a year
over a periold of eleven years. This generous donation has made
possible the practical prosecution of the work for which the, Institute is organized. Following out its program and availing of
the means thus placed within its grasp, the Institute has appointed the following gentlemen as reporters. that is, persons
who are to prepare for submission to and consideration by the
Council of the Institute restatements of the law upon the topics
indicated:
On the law of contracts. Professor Samuel \Villiston, of
the Law School of Harvard University;
On the law of torts. Professor Francis H. Bohlen, of the
Law School of the University of Pennsylvania;
On the lav of agency, Professor Floyd R. Mechem, of the
University of Chicago;
On the conflict of laws, Professor Joseph H. Beale, of.
the
Law School of Harvard University.
Dr. William Draper Lewis, the director of the Ihstitute,
formerly Dean of the Law School of the University of Pennsylvania, one of those most active in inspiring its organizationr and
in the preparation of the preliminary report, is employed in the
preparation of a report on the practicability of undertaking a
restatement of the law of business associations, and Dean Pound,
of the Law School of Harvard University. is preparing a report on classification and terminology.
Mr. Austin W. Scott and Mr. Calvert Magrudir, of the
Law School of Harvard University, have been appointed to assist Mr. Beale in the preparation of a restatement of the law, on
conflict of laws, and the Honorable Herbert S. Hadley, recently
elected President of,.Washington University of St. Louis, Iissouri, and Messrs. William E. Mikell, Dean of the Law School
of the University of Pennsylvania, and John G. Milburn, of the
New York bar, have been appointed a committee to prepare and
report to the Council a draft of a survey and statement on. the

-
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defects in criminal justice, for the purpose of determining
whether or not the Institute may profitably undertake a restatement of any branch of the criminal law.
A conference was held in Cambridge, Mass., June 25-27,
1923, which was attended by the-President* and the Director,
six of the Council, three of the reporters above named, and
Messrs. Arthur L. Corbin. of Yale University, William H. Page,
of the University of Wisconsin, and William H. Oliphant, of
Columbia University, who were specially invited for their advice on the restatement of the law of contracts; Messrs. John G.
Buchanan, of Pittsburgh, Pa., Herbert F. Goodrich, of the University of Michigan: Ernest G. Lorenzen, of Yale Ulniversity,
and Monte M. Lemann, of New Orleans, who were specially
invited for their advice on the conflict of laws. Messrs. J. Weston Allen, of Boston, Massachusetts, Edwin R. Keedy, of the
University of Pennsylvania, and James Bronson Reynolds, of
New York, who were specially invited for their advice with
respect to a survey or statement of defects in criminal justice;
Messrs. Edmund M. Morgan and Karl N' Llewellyn, of Yale
University, who were specially invited to discuss ways for securing facts bearing upon the practical application of legal principles, and Mr. Shippen Lewis, of Philadelphia, who was specially invited for his advice on the form which the restatement
should take. This conference was called to determine such
questions in regard to the form of the restatement. as ought to
be decided before work on any one topic was substantially advanced. There were also special questions in regard to the work
on those different topics, as to which the reporters for the subjects selected desired the comment and criticism of the persons
specially invited for that purpose. The conference continued in
session for three days.
There were submitted to the conference on the part of the
reporters various forms of a proposed restatement, which were
criticised and discussed. The conference agreed to make the
following recommendations to the reporters and the Council of
the Institute:
* The author of this article is the active President of the Institute.-Eix
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(i) That Restatements should be separate from the Treatises:
(2) That the principles embodied in a restatement should
set forth the law with much greater fullness than would be the
case if it were merely a "conclusion of general principles" over
which at present little or no difference of opinion exists;
(3) That the law as set forth in the restatement shall be
capable of being understood and applied without the necessity
of referring to the treatise, the statement of principles being
accompanied by illustrations and explanations;
(4) That each treatise shall be complete from three points
of view:

(a) citation of authority;
(b) the presentation of the present certainties, uncertainties
and confusions in the law;
(c) the justification of the principles set forth in the restatement
If these rules are followed, it is believed that from a reading
of the restatement, the law as set forth in the statement of principles can be thoroughly understood and consistently applied;
but it will be only by reading the treatise that the certainties, uncertainties and confusions arising from the recorded decisions
can be ascertained.
The specific form which the restatement shall take is, of
course, to be finally determined when there shall be submitted
to the Council drafts of definite restatements of the law prepared in conformity with the rules above stated. Whether the
formulation adopted by Sir James Stephen in his "Law of Evidence," or the method employed by such- writers as Dicey and
Pollock and Williston shall be used, must be left to experience.
I have already quoted what Judge Dillon has pointed out regarding the work of Sir James Stephen. Dicey's "Digest of tie
Law of England in Reference to the Conflict of Laws." is composed, first, of a table of principles and rules covering 6o pages,
embracing 2o3 rules. This is followed by an introduction of
65 pages, 134 pages of preliminary matters, and elaborate notes,
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the whole making a volume of 952 pages. Sir Frederick Pollock's principles of the law of contracts (that is, the Third
American, taken from the Seventh British, Edition), is divided
into 14 chapters, and, in all, fills an octavo volume of- 985 pages.
,Mr. Williston's law of contracts contains three -olumes of textbook reading composed of 2o44.sections, filling 3456 pages, di,vided into eight books. The Civil Code of California, fills 836
octavo pages, divided into 3543 sections; the two volumes of
the Civil Code of Georgia are made up of 4639 sections. Lord
Halsbury's "Laws of England" fill 29-volumes of-approximately
i8oo pages each, besides 4t- supplemental volume. No other code
or statement of the law is expressed in the condensed brevity
of Stephen's "Code of Evidence."
These books merely indicate lines of suggestion to the reporters who are engaged upon the work. of restating particular
subjects of the law for the American Law Institute. -What they
may accomplish by way of condensation remains -to be seen. It
is recognized that the work cannot be done hastily, and that
it will .involve infinite pains and enormous labor. .When the
proposals of the reporters have been laid before, the Council of
the .Institute, the work of criticism and suggestion will -begin.
The great object is-to prodtice accurate statements of what the
law -actually is, -Which will dispense with the necessity of any
one in the future searching through the myriads of precedents
which these reporters will'have examined and analyzed in reaching the- conclusions -embodied in their-work. As Lord Halsbury
says in his introduction to the "Laws of England":
"The alteration of existing law and the process of
merely stating what the law is, are two very different functions and the confusion between the two has marred many
an effort to get a- clear and intelligible code." 1
It is the statement of exising law which the Institute has underfaken. As Mr. Justice Holnes observes'
"The reports of a given jurisdiction in the course of a
generation take up pretty much the whole body of the law
'I

Halsbury CCIX.
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and restate it from the present point of view. We could
reconstruct the corpus from them if all that went befo'e
were burned."
Our effort will be to attempt this reconstruction before the
auto-da-fe, and in so doing, to relegate what' went before into
as complete extinction as if it had been consumed in Don Quixote's courtyard under the auspices of his curate and the barber.
The affairs of the Institute at present are managed by a
Council of twenty-one members. The executive direction is in
the hands of a Director, a post which was filled by the election
of Dean William Draper Lewis, to whom the Institute largely
owes its existence. The by-laws provide that no member of the
Council shall, while remaining a member, receive any compensation from the Institfite. It was felt that the government of the
corporation should be entirely free from any pecuniary interest
in its work.
There has been some criticism of the fact that, of the original members of the Council, only two resided west of the Mississippi River. This was unavoidable, because in the early stages
of its existence, when frequent conferences and meetings were
required, it was necessary that a quorum of the Executive Committee and the Council might be assembled on-reasonably short
notice. Those most active in the original movement and who
were committed to the effort to place it upon a practical basis,
very largely came from the law schools and the Bar east of the
Mississippi. But it is the intention of the members of the
Council that this condition shall be only temporary. By authority of the by-laws the number of the Council has been increased
to thirty-three, and the additional members thus provided for
will shortly be added. It is intended to select them from all
parts of the country in such manner that the body shall be widely
representative of the profession in all parts of the United
States.
The members of the Council are equally divided into three
classes whose terms expire December 31. 192,6, 1929 and 1932,
respectively. Their successors are to be chosen by the members
of the Institute.
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The persons whose names appeared on the roll of the
\Vashington meeting, the ninubers of the Council and any other
persons elected by the Council or by the Institute' are members;
besides which. the by-laws provide that the follox\ing shall be
members during their continuance of their respective offices, viz.:
i ) The Chief Justice of the United States and the Associate justices of the Supreme Court of the United
States;
(2) The senior Judge of each United States Circuit Court
of Appeals;
(3) The Attorney General and the Solicitor General of
the United States;
(4) The Chief Justice of the Court of Appeals. of the
District of Columbia;
(5) The Chief Justice of the highest court of each State:
(6) The President of the American Bar Association and
the members of its Executive Committee;
(7) The President of each State Bar Association;
(8) The Dean of each school belonging to the Association
of American Law Schools;
(9) The President of the American Institute of Criminal
Law and Criminology;
(io)
The President of the American Branch of the International Law Association;
(i i) The President of the American Judicature Society;
(12) The President of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws;
(3)
The President of the American Society of International Law.
There were present at the Washington meeting about 315
persons, including those present in a representative capacity, and
since the Washington meeting the Council has elected sixty-five
members. The ex-officio members will number about i8o. In general, the Executive Committee is inclined to recommend that the
total membership of the Institute, not including members in
representative capacity. be limited to 750 persons.
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The Washington meeting demonstrated the existence of a
nation-wide recognition, by the Bench and Bar of the country,
of the need for some such work as that upon which the Institute
has embarked. It is the intention of the Council and the officers
of the Institute, so far as they may, to keep this interest alive
by frequent reports of progress made in the work undertaken.
But it should also be emphasized that the work cannot and
should not be done hastily. The thoroughness of preparation
and the sound learning required, can be secured only by giving
those engaged upon it ample time in which to perform their
tasks. Considering the character and standing of the men employed and the record of their professional accomplishment, the
officers of the Institute are sanguine enough to believe that the
work which they have undertaken is not an idle dream, but may
soon become an actual realization. If this be so, the Bar will
have discharged its highest obligation to the community of which
it is a part, by taking a long step toward the removal of the
reproach of uncertainty in the character, and delay in the administration of the law. If the effort be successful, our law will
have ceased to be what Tennyson reproachfully termed it:
"The lawless science of our law,
That codeless myriad of precedent,
That wilderness of single instances."
George IW. Ifickersham.
Xezw York Cikt.

